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Roberts: The Revised Article 5069-1.07(b).

THE REVISED ARTICLE 5069-1.07(b)
HARRY M. ROBERTS, JR.*
In 1975, the Texas Legislature passed article 5069-1.07(b)' (the
"present article") which reads as follows:
(b) Notwithstanding any contrary provisions of the law, any person
may agree to pay, and may pay pursuant to such an agreement, the
same rate of interest as corporations (other than non-profit corporations) on any loan in the principal amount of $500,000 or more, which
is made for the purpose of interim financing for construction on real
property or financing or refinancing of improved real property, and
such a loan shall not be subject to the defense of usury unless it
exceeds the maximum lawful interest rate for corporations (other
than non-profit corporations).
Because of certain problems with the language of this article, a
group of attorneys practicing in real estate drafted and proposed to
the 1979 legislature a revision of this statute. The revision (the
"amended article") passed the Texas Legislature as Senate Bill 10
which reads as follows:
(b) Notwithstanding any contrary provisions of law, any person
may agree to pay, and may pay pursuant to such an agreement, any
rate of interest not exceeding 18 percent per annum, if such agreement is evidenced by a written bond, note, or other contract of such
person providing for a loan or other extension of credit in the original
principal amount of $250,000 or more, or any series of advances of
money if the aggregate of all sums advanced or agreed or contemplated to be advanced pursuant to such agreement equals or exceeds
$250,000 or any extension or renewal of such loan or other extension
of credit (regardless of whether or not the outstanding principal balance thereof at the time of such renewal or extension is $250,000 or
more); and as to any such agreement to pay or payment, the claim
or defense of usury by such person or such person's heirs, personal
representatives, successors, substitutes or anyone else on such person's behalf, or by any person acting as guarantor, surety, accommodation maker, or endorser for or with respect to such agreement to
pay or payment, or by any person assuming the obligation of such
* B.A., Southern Methodist University; LL.B., Harvard University, Partner, Thompson,
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art. 5069-1.07(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
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payment or otherwise becoming liable therefor, or by any person
owning or acquiring property subject to a lien securing such agreement to pay or such payment is prohibited. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained herein, this Subsection (b) shall not
apply to any loan or other extension of credit secured by (i) a lien on
a building, constructed or to be constructed, which both is used or
intended to be used as a single one-to-four family residence and is
occupied or intended to be occupied by a person obligated to pay such
loan or other extension of credit or (ii) a lien on land intended to be
used primarily for agricultural or ranching purposes. Nothing herein
shall be construed to limit or other wise affect the provisions or application of Article 2.09, Texas Miscellaneous Corporation Laws Act, as
amended (Article 1302-1.01 et seq., Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes),
with respect to loans or other extensions of credit not covered hereby.'
This Bill has been signed by the Governor and will become effective
on August 27, 1979.'
The principal changes in the amended article are the expansion
of the concept of a large loan from a loan of $500,000 or more to a
loan of $250,000 or more and the removal of the restriction that the
statute applies only to those loans made for the purpose of interim
financing for construction on real property or financing or refinancing of improved real property.5 The only exceptions to this statute
are that, without regard to amount, it does not apply to any loan or
extension of credit secured by either a lien on a building, constructed or to be constructed, that is used or intended to be used as
a single one-to-four family residence and is occupied or to be occupied by a person obligated to pay the loan or other extension of
credit or a lien on land intended to be used primarily for agricultural
or ranching purposes.
While the present article is restricted in its application to loans
above $500,000 made for the purpose of interim financing for construction on real property or financing or refinancing of improved
real property, the amended article is not restricted in its application
to any particular type of collateral nor to any particular purpose of
the loan. The amended article is intended to cover every loan of
$250,000 or more (except for those loans specifically excepted from
the operation of the article) without regard to the identity of the
3. 1979 Tex. Ses8. Law Serv., ch. 305, § 1, at 704 (Vernon).
4. Id.
5. Compare 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 305, § 1, at 704 (Vernon) with TEX. REv.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.07(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
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lender or the borrower, the purpose of the loan, the type of security,
the existence of security or any other matter.
The inclusion in the present article of only those loans "made for
the purpose of interim financing for construction on real property
or financing or refinancing of improved real property" has caused
numerous problems of interpretation in the real estate lending area.'
For example, it is common for a construction loan to include the cost
of the land as well as costs of construction. Is the portion of the loan
attributable to the purchase of the raw land a loan "made for the
purpose of interim financing for construction on real property?"
Many practitioners think that there is at least an ambiguity here
that requires that two loans be made, one for the land and one for
the construction costs. This involves two sets of loan papers and
increased attorney's fees and other costs. Another example of a
problem of interpretation arises when a loan is made secured by a
lien on improved real property but the proceeds of the loan are to
be used by the borrower for the purchase of other tracts of unimproved real property. Is this loan "for the purpose of financing or
refinancing of improved real property?" The statute does not say
"secured by improved real property;" it is required that the loan be
for the purpose of financing or refinancing of improved real property. Because of this ambiguity, many practitioners have taken the
position that a loan of the above description would not fall within
the present article. It is felt that the amended article removes these
ambiguities regarding the scope and coverage of the article.
The maximum interest rate provided for in the present article has
been changed from "the same rate of interest as corporations (other
than non-profit corporations)" to eighteen percent per annum. One
of the primary requirements for a usury statute is certainty about
what rate can be charged,' and it was felt that a specific rate per
6. Although the present article has never been construed by an appellate court, commentators have pointed out the ambiguities in the statute. See Wallenstein & St. Claire, Property,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 28, 45-46 n.152 (1976).
7. 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 305, § 1, at 704 (Vernon); see TEx. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 1302-2.09 (Vernon Supp. 1963-1978) (corporate rate set at one and one-half percent
per month).
8. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 11. "The Legislature shall have authority to . . . fix
maximum rates of interest; provided however, in the absence of legislation fixing maximum
rates of interest all contracts for a greater rate of interest than ten per centum (10%) shall be
deemed usurious.
... Id. Any statute that purports to regulate interest but fails to define
interest or fix a maximum rate of interest is unconstitutional. See Gonzales County Say. &
Loan Ass'n. v. Freeman, 534 S.W.2d 903, 908 (Tex. 1976).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

3

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 10 [2022], No. 4, Art. 2

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 10:699

annum was preferable to cross-referencing the rate corporations
may pay.' A second advantage to the use of the specific rate is the
removal of the phrase "(other than non-profit corporations)" from
two places in the present article. These references have caused considerable uncertainty since the proviso in the corporate exemption
statute reads "nothing contained herein shall prevent any charitable or religious corporation from asserting the claim or interposing
the defense of usury in any action or proceeding."'' 0 In the years after
article 1302-2.09 was passed in 1967, it was assumed by many practitioners that this reference to charitable or religious corporations
did not include all non-profit corporations, with the result that a
non-profit corporation that was not a charitable or religious corporation could pay interest at a rate of up to one and one-half percent
per month on loans of $5000 or more." The use of the parenthetical
phrase "other than non-profit corporations" in the present article
raised the question whether the original assumption was correct
with the result that many practitioners are now hesitant to give an
opinion that a non-profit corporation which is not a charitable or
religious corporation can pay more than ten percent per year under
article 1302-2.09. It is hoped that the removal of these references in
the amended article will eliminate this problem. Whatever the situation with respect to non-profit corporations under article 1302-2.09,
the all-inclusive definition of "person" as used in the amended article and defined in article 5069-1.01(e)' 2 makes it clear that all nonprofit corporations, including charitable and religious corporations,
are entitled to use the amended article.
Several questions that arise in normal real estate financing practice which are not answered by the present article are answered by
the amended article.
(a) The present article does not cover the situation in which a
series of advances, rather than a lump sum disbursement, equals or
9. See TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.09 (Vernon Supp. 1963-1978). Although the
corporate rate has been set at one and one-half percent per month, at least one court has
stated that the rate is equivalent to eighteen percent per annum. See Micrea, Inc. v. Eureka
Life Ins. Co. of America, 534 S.W. 2d 348, 353 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (dictum).
10. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.09 (Vernon Supp. 1963-1978).
11. See Henderson, Commercial Transactions,Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J.
118, 150-51 (1976).
12. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.01(e) (Vernon 1971). " 'Person' means an
individual, partnership, corporation, joint venture, trust, association or any legal entity,
however organized." Id.
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exceeds the applicable loan limit. The amended article now makes
it clear that it covers a series of advances if the aggregate of all sums
advanced or agreed or contemplated to be advanced pursuant to
the agreement equals or exceeds $250,000.
(b) The present article does not apply when the original loan is
extended or renewed. This problem is particularly acute when the
original loan has been paid down below the cutoff line for a "large
loan." The amended article now provides that if the original loan
equals or exceeds $250,000, any extension or renewal of the loan,
regardless of whether or not the outstanding principal balance
thereof at the time of renewal or extension is $250,000 or more,
comes within the purview of the statute.
(c) The present article does not make it clear who is prohibited
from the claim or defense of usury if the exemption applies. The
amended article provides that the claim or defense of usury is prohibited not only to the borrower but anyone who otherwise sues on
the loan; for example, the borrower's heirs, personal representatives,
successors, substitutes or anyone else on the borrower's behalf, or
any person acting as a guarantor, surety, accommodation maker or
endorser for or with respect to the agreement to pay or payment of
the loan, or any person assuming the obligation of such payment or
otherwise becoming liable therefor or any person owning or acquiring property subject to a lien securing such agreement to pay or such
payment. The amended article is intended to provide a transactional exemption so that if the transaction itself is exempt from the
general usury laws, no person suing on that transaction would have
the right to the claim or defense of usury.
. The amended article contains two exceptions. The first exception
is that the amended article does not apply to any loan or extension
of credit secured by a lien on a building that is used or intended to
be used as a single one-to-four family residence and is occupied or
to be occupied by the person obligated to pay such loan or other
extension of credit. It is important to note that, in order for the
exception to apply, the building must be both used or intended to
be used as a single one-to-four family residence and occupied or to
be occupied by the person obligated to pay such loan or other extension of credit. By this language, it is intended to restrict the exception to one who is actually going to use the building as a one-to-four
family residence so that developers of residential housing will have
the benefit of the amended article.
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The second exception is that the amended article does not apply
to any loan or extension of credit secured by a lien on land intended
to be used primarily for agricultural or ranching purposes. The
words "intended to be used" were employed to make it clear that
the proper consideration is how the owner of the subject property
intends to use the property in the future, not how the property was
used prior to the making of the loan. The word "primarily" was used
to make it clear that an incidental use of the subject property for
agricultural or ranching purposes will not suffice; the property must
be used primarily for those purposes.
The last sentence in the amended article referring to article 13022.09 is intended generally to cover problems of overlapping between
article 1302-2.09 and the amended article and is intended specifically to provide that if a corporation borrows money in an amount
between $5,000 (the lower limit in article 1302-2.09) and $250,000
(the lower limit in the amended article), the provisions of article
1302-2.09 would control.
The amended article should provide greater certainty in the lending community. It is intended to make funds available for large
loans outside of the home mortgage area, without the necessity for
incorporation and regardless of the purpose of the loan. Although
new ambiguities may arise, the amendment should eliminate the
questions and restrictions that have arisen under the present article.
Hopefully the new statute will help insure the availability of funds
in the area of large loans, and will bring some certainty into the
complex field of interest rates and usury law.
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